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Spectators versus stakeholders with/without information: the difference it makes for justice 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
It is quite common to find reference in the popular press and in the political debate to the idea of 
“meritocracy”. In such concept what people deserve is generally measured with reference to effort and/or 
talent. But what people think of different types of meritocracy
1 and does their preference for meritocracy 
depends on their rank in the society according to meritocratic criteria? The main goal of this paper is to give 
an answer to these questions with an original contribution to the existing literature.  
The issue of distributive justice has a long tradition in the literature around three main fairness ideals: 
strict egalitarianism, libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism (Cappelen et al. 2007). Strict egalitarianism 
stresses that no inequalities in wealth distribution should be allowed even when people contribute in 
different  ways  to  wealth  creation.  Libertarianism  argues  that  individuals  should  be  considered  totally 
responsible for their contributions in producing wealth and a fair distribution should precisely reflect the 
different contributions. Liberal egalitarianism can be intended as an intermediate position as it argues that 
only  inequalities  in  wealth  distribution  arising  from  factors  under  individual  control  may  be  accepted  
(Cappelen et al. 2007). When strict egalitarianism is ruled out, the debate on fairness ideals becomes 
essentially related to the idea of meritocracy or desert and is therefore associated to the role of talent and 
effort as possible criteria to determine the “merit” of people in different contexts. This is because the idea 
that  distributions  which  reflect  individual  achievements  or  contributions  are  fair  (and  do  not,  or  only 
partially, need to be redistributed) depends on the assumption that such achievements/contributions have 
been deserved by individuals. In this perspective, many researchers have analyzed from a theoretical and 
an empirical point of view how differences in talent, chance and effort may affect (perceived) fairness of 
income and wealth distribution (see section 2). 
                                                           
1 Merit is actually an “empty” concept which establishes that people must have what they deserve. The criterion used 
to evaluate what they deserve may be effort, talent but also need. We however use such concept in the paper as in 
the popular meaning in which the criteria considered are generally effort and talent. 3 
 
Our paper contributes to the debate on criteria of fairness and justice by carrying out an experimental 
and empirical analysis aimed at:  
1.  analyzing the criteria preferred by subjects in order to allocate resources within a society when 
they may choose among allocations giving different importance to proxies of talent, effort, partial 
or full egalitarianism, and luck;  
2.  verifying whether people preferences for some criteria are affected by their position and (actual or 
perceived) ranking and payoffs in the society according to such criteria.  
3.  analyzing whether subjects who choose without information about their payoffs under different 
criteria select the criterion they think will maximize their monetary payoffs or whether they choose 
according to some fairness (or, more in general, non self-interested) principles.  
The main feature of our design is therefore in the combination of three elements: i) task performance 
aimed at determining payoff distribution in the meritocratic criteria (criteria based mainly on effort or 
talent);  ii)  direct  choice  of  allocation  criteria;  iii)  different  role  in  the  game:  stakeholder  or  spectator 
with/without information on payoff distribution. More specifically, we identify five positions for allocators 
allowing them to be: i) spectators (i.e. subjects who decide allocation criteria for other players involved in 
the experiments without being affected for such decision in their own monetary payoffs) before knowing 
the distribution of outcomes in relation to each possible criterion that may be used to allocate resources; ii) 
spectators after knowing the distribution of outcomes in relation to each possible criterion; iii) informed 
stakeholders (i.e. players choosing the criterion while being part of the group of players to which the 
money  is  allocated  and  being  informed  from  the  beginning  about  the  distribution  of  outcomes);  iv) 
stakeholders without information on the distribution of outcomes; v) stakeholders after the information on 
the distribution of outcomes is given. As noticed by Konow (2003) the difference between stakeholders 




Our main findings document that: 
1.  spectators (both under ignorance or not of payoff distribution according to different criteria) and 
stakeholders under ignorance of payoff distribution choose to reward talent, after guaranteeing a 
minimal base equal for every player, significantly more than stakeholders who are informed ex ante 
or choose after that information is given;  
2.  the large majority of stakeholders (84.2 percent of them) switch to the criterion which maximizes 
their payoff after knowing the payoff distribution, and, more in general, stakeholders informed 
about the payoff distribution under different criteria tend to select the criterion that maximizes 
their own monetary gain; 
3.  In around two/thirds of cases stakeholders choices under ignorance of payoff distribution are those 
in which they believe to perform relatively better so that their decision may be explained by the 
willingness to maximize their own payoff.  
The paper is divided into six sections (introduction and conclusions included). In the second section we 
discuss the state of art in the literature and how it relates to our paper. In the third section we present our 
experiment design. In the fourth section we specify the research questions inspiring our analysis. In the 
fifth section we provide descriptive and econometric findings aimed at answering such questions. The sixth 
section concludes. 
 
2. The state of art  
2.1. The theoretical contributions 
The debate on justice has a long tradition in economics (for a detailed survey see Konow (2003)).  
According  to  Buchanan  (1986),  among  the  four  factors  determining  the  distribution o f  c l a i m s  o n  
economic income and wealth, i.e. luck, choice, effort, and birth, only differences attributable to effort are 
fair. Dworkin (2000) proposes a political theory that emphasizes equality but tolerates limited inequality 
that he argues would follow by allowing the effect of choices to operate. He states that “individuals should 5 
 
be relieved of consequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute 
bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from their own choices” (Dworkin (2000), p. 
73). Roemer (1998) stresses that the “true” meritocracy should be based on and reward only effort. The 
key aspect here is to be able to discriminate between chance and voluntariness, making ineffective the role 
of the former and allowing only choices due to voluntary people’s decisions to have a role in generating 
different results.
2 In the Rawlsian egalitarianism (1971) a criticism of talent-based principles of justice is 
significant. Since talents are the consequence of a morally arbitrary natural lottery, if the casual distribution 
of talents were reflected by the distribution of goods or rights, then, also the final distribution of resources 
and the associated social structure would be morally arbitrary (see also Sacconi, 2011). According to Rawls 
(1971)  the  only  acceptable  solution  is  an  equal  income  distribution  and  talented  persons  should  be 
rewarded if, by using their abilities, they may improve the general situations of the society thus allowing 
also poorest people to improve their condition. A completely different perspective is adopted by Robert 
Nozick (1974). According to his entitlement theory, if a person acquires a holding without breaking the 
principle of justice in acquisition, or in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer,
3 then he is 
entitled to the holding. On this basis it is clear that interventions aimed at preventing and/or modifying 
acquisitions that are in accordance with these principles are not justified, even if based on some ideas of 
meritocracy. Finally, among other approaches to the notion of distributive justice, a central role must also 
be recognized to the approach based on the concepts of capabilities and functionings proposed by Sen. Sen 
(1999) proposes an idea of equality of opportunity  to reach some essential conditions of “beings and 
doings” (such as being healthy, having self-respect etc.) independently from individual life plans. This idea 
of  equality  of  opportunity  clearly  mitigates  the  previously  stressed  undesirable  consequences  of 
meritocracy. 
                                                           
2 To this aim, the “relative” voluntary effort, as defined by Roemer, would be identified by considering the individual 
position in the effort distribution for each type, i.e. the set of not relevant characteristics and rewards should vary 
positively with effort and should not differ for those who exert the same effort. 
3 Nozick prefers the term “justice in holdings” instead of “distributive justice” that is not a neutral term: “Hearing the 
term “distribution”, most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses some principle or criterion to give out a 
supply of things” (Nozick 1974, p. 149). 6 
 
2.2. The experimental contributions 
The role of the experimental literature in this debate has been to verify which of these visions of justice 
find  consensus  among  people  (not  just  in  their  survey  answers  but  also  in  their  actual  behaviour  in 
randomized  experiments  where  their  choices  affect  monetary  payoffs)  and  how  and  whether  their 
decisions change according to their (spectator, stakeholder) role in the game.  
An important part of these contributions (e.g. Leventhal and Michaels, 1971; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; 
Ruffle,  1998;  Burrows  and  Loomes,  1994)  essentially s h o w  t h a t  s u b j e c t s  s e e m  t o  p e r c e i v e  a s  f a i r e r  
differences when they are based on effort or skills (for example related to quiz knowledge or search tasks) 
but not on luck. Other studies (e.g. Schokkaert and Lagrou, 1983; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Overlaet, 1991) 
confirm that people reward individual contribution, but disregard birth, (brute) luck, and choices that do 
not affect productivity. In fact, in these analyses respondents choose equal splits when the descriptions of 
education and position suggest they do not impact on productivity, but opt for a greater contribution, and 
therefore a reward, when individuals exert greater effort. 
To the aim and characteristics of the present contribution, it is worth referring in particular to the 
studies  by  Cappelen,  Hole,  Sørensen  and  Tungodde  (2007),  and  by  Durante  and  Putterman  (2007). 
Cappelen,  Hole,  Sørensen  and  Tungodde  (2007)  take  into  consideration  the  three  fairness  ideals  we 
mention in the introduction (Strict egalitarianism, Libertarianism and Liberal egalitarianism) in order to 
show how one may estimate simultaneously the prevalence of different fairness ideals and the degree of 
importance people attach to fairness considerations in an experiment in which participants have a stake in 
the  outcome.  The  authors  implement  a  dictator  game where the  distribution  phase  is  preceded  by a 
production phase with the latter depending on both factors within and factors beyond personal control. 
Authors find that participants are motivated by considerable pluralism in the fairness ideals and that liberal 
egalitarians and libertarians are the majority.  
Durante  and Putterman (2007) study  the  relative  importance of  different  fairness  preferences,  risk 
aversion, and self-interest in determining support for redistribution. With their experimental design they 7 
 
give subjects the opportunity to fix a tax rate and aim at studying how support for redistribution varies 
according to different aspects: i) whether or not the subject who decides the tax rate is part of the group 
affected  by  it;  ii)  whether  or  not  the  subject  has  perfect  information  on  his  relative  position  in  the 
distribution;  iii)  whether  or  not  the  initial  distribution  depends  on  task  performance;  iv)  the  cost  of 
redistribution; v) the deadweight loss related to the taxation. The authors find that: i) when subjects are 
impartial observers they tend always to tax in order to obtain more equalitarian distributions; ii) both the 
cost of taxation and the deadweight loss associated with it affect redistribution; iii) when income is not 
certain, higher demand for redistribution is associated with risk aversion; iv) less redistribution is supported 
by subjects when the initial distribution is determined by task performance. 
In respect to the existing literature, our work considers a wide range of choices (in terms of distributive 
criteria) and positions in which decisions are taken (in terms of spectators and stakeholders with or without 
information about payoff distribution under different criteria) More specifically, compared to the paper by 
Durante and Putternam (2007), the closest to ours in terms of choices and players’ positions considered, 
we allow players to choose directly an allocation criterion instead of expressing their preferences indirectly 
by choosing a tax rate ex post. In this way we may explore a parallel uninvestigated issue and verify the 
preferred criterion people choose to allocate resources within a group.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedure 
In what follows we describe in detail our experiment with special reference to: i) the description of 
different tasks on which allocation criteria chosen by players are based; ii) the position of players in the 
game.  





3.1 The task and the criteria 
The task consists of distributing a sum of money (S) among N participants
4 . The sum may be allocated 
through seven criteria (whatever the task and the criterion selected our one is a fixed cake experiment as 
many other in this literature, e.g. Durante and Putterman, 2007).
5 
Criterion 1  - LUCK. It is based on a random draw. For each participant, the computer draws a number 
between 1 and 100. Each participant receives from the total sum the ratio between her own and the sum of 
all the numbers drawn by participants.
6  





Criterion 3 - EFFORT. It is based on subjects’ relative performance on a secretarial task. In particular, 
experimental subjects are asked to copy information about fictitious students (enrolment number, name, 
surname and mark) into a file. Participants are informed that the computer signals mistakes and waits for 
corrections, and therefore the data have to be copied in the correct way. Each participant receives part of 
the sum that is proportional to the number of copied lines.
7 
Criterion 4 - TALENT. It is based on subjects’ relative performance on a pool of tasks aimed at measuring 
subjects’ capabilities. In particular, they are asked to perform some tasks based on the WAIS-R test (the 
                                                           
4 We planned sessions with 15 participants and S=210 euro, however, in a few cases, because of lack of subjects, we 
ran sessions with 14 subjects and S=196 or 13 subjects and S=182, see figure 1b for details on subjects and sessions 
across treatments. 
5 This implies that players’ abilities have redistributive and not aggregate value creating effects. It may be reasonably 
inferred that individuals are more inclined to opt for talent and effort versus full egalitarianism if higher performance 
in terms of talent and effort has aggregate value enhancing effects, that is, that they are willing to accept more 
inequality if this helps to increase the total cake. In this sense a fixed cake experiment may be considered as the least 
favourable environment (among the fixed and value enhancing settings) for evaluating preferences for effort and 
talent. 
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tasks are: finding missing details in various pictures, putting some pictures in the right order in order to 
create stories with logical meaning - between 3 and 6 pictures in relation to each story, to identify the 
analogies characterizing different pairs of words such as “car-bicycle”) as well as Raven’s matrices. Each 
participant receives part of the sum that is proportional to the number of correct answers.
8 
Criterion 5 - PROTECTION+LUCK. It is a mixed criterion according to which 30% of S is equally distributed 
among  participants, while  the  remaining  part  is  allocated  through  random  draw  (as  criterion  1). Each 
participant receives a payoff that consists of both a fixed and a variable part
9.  
Criterion 6 - PROTECTION+EFFORT. It is a mixed criterion according to which 30% of S is equally distributed 
among participants, while the remaining part is allocated on the basis of subjects’ relative performance on 
a secretarial task (as in criterion 3). Each participant receives a payoff that consists of both a fixed part and 
a variable one
10  
Criterion 7 - PROTECTION+TALENT. It is a mixed criterion according to which 30% of S is equally distributed 
among participants, while the remaining part is allocated on basis of subjects’ relative performance on a 
pool of tasks aimed at measuring subjects’ capabilities. (as criterion 4). Each participant receives a payoff 
that consists of both a fixed part and a variable one
11.  
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The seven criteria are designed to mimic different ideas of redistribution. In particular: i) criterion EQUAL 
simply  replicates  a  perfectly  egalitarian  society  where  the  whole  surplus  is  equally  divided  among 
participants, irrespective of their actions; ii) criteria LUCK, EFFORT and TALENT are aimed at mimicking 
scenarios  where  luck  and/or  meritocracy  determine  economic  success;  iii)  the  three  mixed  criteria  – 
PROTECTION+LUCK, PROTECTION+EFFORT and PROTECTION+TALENT – are designed in order to mimic a 
society where luck or meritocracy determine wealth differences, given that each citizen is provided the 
basic needs (i.e. health, instruction). 
Notice that the two labels assigned to the secretarial task and to the psychological test imply that we 
consider results from these activities as a proxy of (untalented) effort and talent respectively since our two 
selected tasks do not identify orthogonal measures of effort and talent. In fact, it is not possible to exclude 
that ability and writing speeds required to perform in the secretarial task are not affected by innate talent. 
On the other hand, it is plausible to suppose that a good performance in the psychological test implies a 
certain level of effort (also effort related to previous school or other activities through which the abilities 
measured by the psychological tests may be developed
12). However, given the characteristics of the tasks 
(very boring and simple the secretarial task and quite based on “logical abilities” the tasks taken from the 
WAIS-R and the Raven’s matrices), it is reasonable to assume that effort is perceived by experimental 
subjects  more  important  in  the  secretarial  task  and t a l e n t  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  t e s t s .  
Moreover, our analysis is essentially aimed at studying the differences between meritocracy and other 
distributive criteria, then the crucial point is that both the EFFORT and TALENT criterion are perceived by 
                                                           
12 Raven (2000) surveys the stability and the variation in the norms for the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test (the 
Raven’s matrices are a tool used in our experiment) for various cultural, ethnic, and socio-economic groups. Various 
factors seem to affect the “educative” ability (the ability to make meaning out of confusion, to produce high-level, 
normally nonverbal, schemata that make it simple to handle complexity), and the “reproductive” ability (the ability to 
absorb, recall, and reproduce information made explicit and communicated from a person to another one) that are 
measured by using the Raven’s Matrices (Raven 2000, p.2). Among other factors, a role is played by parents’ behavior 
concerning  education,  (e.g.  if  parents  “involve  their  children  in  their  own  attempts  to  make  sense  of  difficult 
situations, as they use their feelings as a basis for ‘‘experimental’’ action, as they resolve value conflicts, and as they 
consider the long-term social consequences of their actions” (Raven 2000, p.33)) and other experiences related for 
example  to  “the  undertaking  of  more  complex  educational  activity  (e.g.,  project-based,  enquiry-oriented  work)” 
(Raven 2000, p.34). Matarazzo and Herman (1984) and Kaufman, McLean, Reynolds (1988) show that the subjects’ 
performance in the WAIS-R test (and also in respect to the single sub-tests used in our experiment, Kaufman, McLean, 
Reynolds (1988)) is strictly correlated with their educational level. 11 
 
subjects as based on the idea of merit (while the LUCK and EQUAL criteria should be perceived as based on 
other factors).  
 
3.2 The treatments 
The  experiment  consists  of  three  treatments  –  STAKE,  INFOSTAKE  and  SPECTATOR  -  where  the 
distinguishing factor is either the level of information or the involvement of subjects who have to choose 
the criterion to be implemented (see Figures 1a and 1b). In all the treatments the task is the same - 
choosing among the above described criteria how to distribute a sum of money (S) among N participants. In 
all scenarios participants are informed that each subject is asked to indicate her preferred criterion, but at 
the end of the session only one subject will be randomly drawn by the computer and her choice will be 
implemented. 
 
The STAKE treatment 
In the STAKE treatment, subjects are asked to choose the criterion they want to implement both with 
and without information about their own payoff under the different criteria.  
In the first stage they are told to define how to allocate the sum (S) and they are instructed about the 
seven available criteria they will have to choose among. At that point, players are provided some examples 
of both the secretarial task and the quiz aimed at measuring their capabilities. The aim is to let them 
choose without knowing their performance, but without any doubt concerning the tasks. The idea is that, if 
they do not know the nature of the task they will be asked to perform, each participant will develop a 
subjective forecast of what the activities will be. Consequently, both their decisions and their expectations 
will be based on uncontrolled factors. 
In the second stage, participants are asked to choose the criterion they want to implement (we name 
the scenario in which this decision is taken “STAKE EX ANTE”; notice that the “STAKE EX ANTE” scenario is 
not a single treatment, but it is a choice condition within the STAKE treatment). After their choice, they 12 
 
participate in the activities – they take the quiz for 15 minutes and perform the secretarial task for further 
15  minutes  –  and  the  computer  draws  a  number  for  each  participant.  Then,  results  are  provided.  In 
particular,  each  subject  is  informed  about  both  her p e r f o r m a n c e  o n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  t h e  
performance  of  all  the  other  players.  Moreover,  each  participant  is  provided  the  complete  payoff 
distribution for each possible criterion. This implies that each player perfectly knows her position within the 
society for each possible criterion. 
In the third stage, a replay of the choice procedure is held – subjects are given the opportunity to either 
confirm their first choice or to change the voted criterion (we name the scenario in which this decision is 
taken “STAKE EX POST”). After that, the computer draws the decisive player and the payoffs are displayed 
(see Figure 1a).  
 
The INFOSTAKE treatment 
In the INFOSTAKE treatment, subjects choose the criterion only after having received information on 
their own payoff under the different criteria. This means that the only difference with respect to the STAKE 
treatment is that, after reading the instructions, players directly participate in the activities. Consequently, 
they choose their preferred criterion only once, after being informed about their actual ranking in each 
possible scenario.  
 
The SPECTATOR treatment 
In the SPECTATOR treatment, two types of participants are involved – A-players and B-players. In this 
treatment, M A-players have to allocate a sum (S) among N B-players (see Figure 1). This means that, after 
reading the instructions, A and B-players are involved in different activities. B-players have to perform both 
the secretarial task and the quiz as in the first two treatments, while A-players are asked to choose a 
criterion to distribute the sum (S) among B-players both before and after knowing B-players’ complete 
payoffs distribution (we name these two scenarios respectively “SPECTATOR EX ANTE” and “SPECTATOR EX 13 
 
POST”). It is common knowledge that A-players’ choices affect B-players’ payoffs only. At the same time, 
each participant knows that at the end of the session one A-player is randomly drawn by the computer and 
her choice made when knowing the complete payoffs distribution is implemented.  
In each treatment, before exiting the session, subjects are asked to participate in a typical Holt and 
Laury lottery in order to elicit their risk attitudes. Finally, before receiving their payment, they fill in a socio-
demographic  questionnaire.  These  last  two  activities  provided  an  extra  payment  and  are  not  pre-
announced to the subjects in order to avoid any kind of influence on their decisions.  
In three sessions out of six in the STAKE and in the SPECTATOR treatment, an additional payment is 
given to players (only to B-players in the SPECTATOR treatment) as a the result of their beliefs elicitation. In 
particular, we asked subjects to declare how many participants they think will have a better performance 
under each possible criterion. They are paid on their expectation concerning the implemented criterion 
through the Quadratic Scoring Rule method
13. 
3.3 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire filled in by subjects at the end of the experiment is a structured questionnaire of 69 
questions relative to different socio-economic aspects. It collects information about: a) socio-demographic 
characteristics  (e.g.  date  of  birth,  sex,  nationality,  number  of  family  members,  etc.);  b)  social  status 
(education of parents, their job, family income, etc.); c) social capital (social capital has been considered in 
terms of network – e.g. number of friends and acquaintances etc. -, trust – both generalized and specific 
trust towards some institutions such as banks, the judicial system, etc. -, and civicness – e.g. political 
participation, how often one reads newspapers, etc.); d) risk aversion. Compilation of the questionnaire 
lasts on average 30 minutes. 
 
 
                                                           
13 Belief elicitation using a quadratic scoring rule is widely employed in experimental economics (see for instance 
Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Offerman et al.,1996 and 2009; Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1985; Holt, 1986; Selten, 
1998; Huck and Weizsacker, 2002) 14 
 
3.4 The payoffs  
In  each  treatment,  subjects’  payoff  is  the  sum of  the  payments obtained over  the  session through 
different activities. Both in the STAKE and in the INFOSTAKE treatment, each player i receives a payoff 
i i i RA S P + + = ω α  
that consists of three elements: i) the part αi of S that she receives on the basis of the implemented 
criterion, taking account that S = 14€*N; ii) the amount (W = 3€) received by each player for filling in the 
questionnaire; iii) the amount  { } 85 . 3 00 . 2 60 . 1 10 . 0 ∈ i RA  received as the result of the Holt and 
Laury lottery. In three sessions out of six in the STAKE treatment, we elicited players’ beliefs. Consequently, 
in this case their payoff is:  i i i i B RA S P + + + = ω α  where  [ ] 50 . 1 ,0 ∈ i B € is the earning due to beliefs 
elicitation.  
In the SPECTATOR treatment we have to distinguish between the two types of players. For each A-player 
the payoff is:  i i i RA A PA + + = ω  where Ai is the show-up fee equal to 7€ while W and RAi are the same as 
in the first two treatments. Finally, for each B-player the payoff is:  i i i i B RA S PB + + + = ω α  
3.5 The procedure 
Overall, 265 undergraduate students of the University of Milano-Bicocca participated in the experiment 
(see  Figure  1b).  87  participated  in  the  STAKE  treatment  –  and  for  42  of  the  we  elicited  their  beliefs 
concerning other players’ performance. 59 participated in the INFOSTAKE treatment. 119 took part in the 
SPECTATOR (60 players A and 59 player B). No student took part to more than one session. We ran all the 
sessions at the Experimental Economic Lab (EELAB) of the University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
14. Decisions 
and performance are recorded through the computer and the experiment is programmed and conducted 
with Z-tree.  
                                                           
14 The program was written by the programmer of the AL.EX, Dr. Marie-Edith Bissey. 15 
 
Participants enter the Lab and take a seat in front of a computer. They are immediately asked to switch 
off their mobiles and to stop talking to their colleagues. Instructions are read by participants on their 
computer screen, while an experimenter reads them out loudly. They are handed out too, in order to let 
people refresh the criteria before taking their decisions. After subjects are informed about the task of the 
experiment, the criteria and the nature of the activities they will perform, a set of control questions is 
asked in order to be sure that players understand the rules of the game when taking decisions. 
The average duration is 1 hour and a half for the STAKE and INFOSTAKE treatments and 2 hours for the 
SPECTATOR treatment. The complete experiment preserved anonymity among participants.  
 
4. Research questions  
The  experimental  and  empirical  analysis  carried  out i n  o u r  p a p e r  a i m s  a t  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h r e e  m a i n  
research questions.  
QUESTION 1: What is the preferred criterion chosen by people in order to allocate a sum within a group 
when criteria based on meritocracy (based on talent or effort), equality and luck are allowed? 
In particular, how does the choice change when: 
•  1A: the criterion selected does not affect the payoff of subjects who make the choice (SPECTATOR 
treatment vs. STAKE and INFOSTAKE treatments)? 
•  1B: the decision is taken by stakeholders ignoring or not of their relative payoffs under the different 
criteria  (STAKE  EX  ANTE  scenario  vs.:  STAKE  EX  POST s c e n a r i o ,  I N F O S T A K E  t r e a t m e n t ,  a n d  
SPECTATOR treatment)? 
QUESTION  2:  Do  subjects  informed  about  their  possible  gains  under  the  different  criteria  choose  the 
criterion that maximizes their monetary payoff, behaving as the standard “homo oeconomicus” approach 
would predict, or do they choose by following some other (“ideal” or, more in general, not self-interested) 
principles ? 16 
 
QUESTION 3: Do stakeholders who choose without information on their relative payoff select the criterion 
they think will maximize their monetary payoff or do they choose according to other (ideal) principles? 
 
5.Experimental evidence 
5.1. Descriptive findings on socio-demographic-variables 
Tables  1  and  2  provide  legend  and  summary  descriptive  findings  for  the  main  socio-demographic 
controls  used  in  our  empirical  analysis  for  all  participants  to  the  experiments  (including  those  in  the 
SPECTATOR treatment who do not choose the criterion). They document that age variation of players is 
wide (more than 20 years) and around 60 percent of them are males. The average size of their households 
is of 3.9 members and around 25 (20) of them have a father (mother) with a University degree. Only 5 
percent have an ERASMUS
15 experience while around 21 percent declare that they have lived abroad for at 
least more than 1 month. The average score of their school leaving examination is 78 (out of 100), while 
that of their university exams is 25 (18 is pass and 30 the top mark according to the Italian grading system). 
When we control with Chi square, Wilcoxon and Kolmogorov Smirnov nonparametric tests the balancing 
properties of our three  treatments we find that the null of no significant difference in distributions of 
socio-demographic controls is rejected in none of the three possible two-by-two combination comparisons 
(Table 3) at 5 percent level. 
 
5.2. Results related to QUESTION 1. 
Result 1. Two crucial factors significantly modify players’ choices: a) the difference between the condition 
of informed stakeholder and that of spectator; b) information on payoff distribution for stakeholders. Both 
stakeholders under ignorance of their relative payoff and spectators tend to prefer meritocratic criteria, 
while stakeholders informed on their relative payoffs under the different criteria tend to prefer criteria that 
maximize their payoff (opting for luck and disregarding protection).  
                                                           
15 ERASMUS stands for European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, students who 
participate in the ERASMUS program may spend a legally recognized period of study in a foreign University. 17 
 
5.2.1 Descriptive and statistical findings. A descriptive inspection on criteria chosen by players under 
the different treatments is provided by Table 4. In the same Table 4, we also create the following four 
combined choices: at least talent (which includes choices of talent or protection plus talent), at least effort 
(which includes choices of effort and protection plus effort), at least protection (which includes equal, 
protection plus effort and protection plus talent) and desert (which includes effort, talent, protection plus 
effort and protection plus talent).  
When we analyze players’ preferences, we observe that a large number of both stakeholders without 
information about their payoff and spectators choose “meritocracy” – specifically, protection plus talent 
(around  30  and  45  percent  respectively)  -  while  stakeholders  who  are  informed  (in  the  INFOSTAKE 
treatment) or have received information on their relative payoff (in the STAKE EX ANTE scenario) prefer 
luck (this is because, as we will see, these subjects tend to choose the criterion that maximize their payoff 
and the payoff distribution under the luck criterion has more variability than those under the other criteria 
thus allowing many subjects to maximize their payoff by precisely choosing the luck criterion, as we will 
show in section 5.3).
16 Among the meritocratic criteria, effort is the least preferred by both stakeholders in 
the STAKE ex ante scenario and spectators, while informed stakeholders almost disregard meritocratic 
criteria with protection. Generally, protection is strongly preferred from both stakeholders ignoring payoff 
distribution and spectators. Overall, very few players opt for strict egalitarianism (their share varies from 10 
to 17 percent across treatments). Note as well that almost no player chooses protection plus luck (with the 
exception of one player in the INFOSTAKE treatment) suggesting that protection and chance are mutually 
exclusive in players’ preferences.  
In order to analyze in depth subjects’ decision in respect to the different criteria, we investigate in which 
direction the differences in the choices operate or what choices are more or less preferred under different 
conditions.  
                                                           
16 Note that, by having chosen this criterion ex post, there is no more uncertainty involved in such choice. We however 
keep on calling it random with reference to the original decision rule used to allocate the money.  18 
 
We observe that two crucial factors significantly modify players’ choices: a) the removal of ignorance on 
payoff distribution for stakeholders; b) the difference between the condition of informed stakeholder and 
that of spectator. In other words, there is no difference between knowledge and “removal of ignorance” – 
STAKE EX POST and INFOSTAKE - and not much difference between the spectators and the stakeholders in 
ignorance of their payoff– SPECTATOR and STAKE EX ANTE. At the same time, the “removal of ignorance” 
does not make a big difference for spectators (except for the effect on protection plus talent).  
Effects of changes and their significance in two-by-two comparisons of different scenarios/treatments 
(STAKE EX ANTE, STAKE EX POST, INFOSTAKE, SPECTATOR EX ANTE and SPECTATOR EX POST) are presented 
in Table 5 and are discussed in detail in what follows: 
i)  STAKE EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX POST (column 1, Table 5). This comparison documents the within 
effect  of receiving  information on  payoff  distribution  under  the  different  treatments  for stakeholders. 
Knowing the payoff distribution reduces significantly the choice of protection plus talent (from around 30 
to 4 percent), protection plus effort (from around 16 to 5 percent) and increases significantly effort (from 
around 8 to 20 percent) and luck (from around 6 to 32 percent) among selected choices. In terms of 
combined  choices,  after  receiving  information  about t h e i r  p a y o f f  s t a k e h o l d e r s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e d u c e  
preference for protection, at least talent and desert (meritocracy). 
ii)  STAKE EX ANTE vs. INFOSTAKE (column 2, Table 5). This comparison documents the between 
effect  of  having  or  not  information  on  their  payoff f o r  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  B e f o r e  k n o w i n g  t h e i r  p a y o f f ,  
stakeholders opt significantly more for protection plus talent (around 30 vs. 3 percent), protection plus 
effort (around 16 vs less than 2 percent) and significantly less for luck (around 6 vs 42 percent). In terms of 
combined choices, before being informed, stakeholders prefer significantly more protection, at least talent 
and desert (meritocracy).  
iii)  STAKE EX POST vs. INFOSTAKE (column 3, Table 5): there are no significant differences in choices 
between stakeholders after having received information on payoff and ex ante informed stakeholders, that 19 
 
is, “removal of ignorance” and ex ante information produce the same results in terms of stakeholders’ 
choices (or having been ex ante ignorant has no effect on stakeholders informed choices).  
iv)  SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs STAKE EX ANTE (column 4, Table 5): there are not strongly significant 
differences between stakeholders and spectators when they do not know the payoff distribution under the 
different  criteria.  The  only  slight  difference  concerns  protection  plus  talent  since  a  higher  number  of 
spectators  choose  this  criterion.  These  findings  imply  that  the  ignorance  of  payoffs  eliminates  the 
differences  between  the spectator  and  the  stakeholders (their choices are substantially different after 
having  received  information  about  payoffs  (see  point  v),  while  they  are  not  so  before  having  the 
information).  
v)  SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX POST (column 5, Table 5): before receiving information on payoff 
distribution spectators choose significantly more protection plus talent (45 vs less than 4 percent) and 
significantly less luck (15 vs around 32 percent) and effort (around 3 vs 20 percent) than stakeholders after 
having  received  information.  Choice  aggregation  documents  that  spectators  in  ignorance  of  payoff 
distribution choose significantly more protection, at least talent and desert. These findings may be viewed 
as the combined effect of ignorance about payoff distribution plus stakeholdership.  
vi)  SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. INFOSTAKE (column 6, Table 5): spectators under ignorance of  payoff 
choose significantly more protection plus talent (45 vs less than 4 percent) and significantly less luck (15 vs 
around    42  percent)  and effort  (around  3 vs 17  percent) than  ex  ante  informed  stakeholders.  Choice 
aggregation  documents  that  spectators  before  receiving  information  on  payoff  distribution  choose 
significantly more protection, at least talent and desert. These findings may be viewed as the combined 
effect of stakeholdership and ignorance on payoff distribution.  
vii)  SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. SPECTATOR EX POST (column 7, Table 5): receiving information on payoffs 
leads spectators to chose slightly less protection plus talent (from 45 to around 33 percent - this finding is 
compensated by a slight increase in the equal, the luck and the protection plus effort choices). 20 
 
viii)  SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX ANTE (column 8, Table 5): after having received information on 
payoffs, spectators choose significantly less talent (10 vs around 24 percent) and significantly more luck 
(around 18 vs around 6 percent) than stakeholders in ignorance of their payoff under different criteria. This 
comparison  provides  the  net  effect  of  the  countervailing  forces  of  ignorance  and  stakeholdership  (vs 
spectatorship) and, in a sense, shows that ignorance dominates the stakeholdership effect in promoting 
talent. 
ix)  SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX POST (column 9, Table 5): after having received information on 
their payoff under different criteria, stakeholders opt significantly less for protection plus talent (33 vs 
around 4 percent), but significantly more for pure effort (5 vs around 20 percent) and pure talent (10 vs 
around  24  percent)  than  spectators  after  having  received  information  on  payoffs.  Choice  aggregation 
documents that stakeholders who receive information choose significantly less protection (the difference is 
almost 40 percent) and at least talent. This comparison documents the effect of stakeholdership on the 
“removal of ignorance”. 
x)  SPECTATOR  EX  POST  vs.  INFOSTAKE  (column  10,  Table  5):  spectators,  after  having  received 
information about payoff distribution, opt significantly more for protection plus talent (33 vs around 4 
percent) and protection plus effort (13 vs around 2 percent) and significantly less for chance (18 vs around 
42 percent) and effort (5 vs around 17 percent) than ex ante informed stakeholders. Choice aggregation 
documents  that  informed  stakeholders  choose  significantly  less  protection  and  at  least  talent.  These 
findings may be viewed as the combined effect of stakeholdership with  information and “removal of 
ignorance” for spectators. 
Finally, even though we do not include an explicit maximin criterion among allocating options we can 
indirectly check how players’ decisions impact on the distance from the maximin. More specifically, we look 
at the change of players’ choices before and after having received information on payoff distribution in the 
STAKE treatment and calculate the distance of the minimum player payoff in a given choice from the 
maximum minimum payoff achievable with one of the 7 allocating choices. Our null hypothesis that the 21 
 
distance from the maximin is unchanged before and after the “removal of ignorance” on payoff distribution 
in the STAKE treatment is rejected (the z-stat of the Wilcoxon test -3.559, p = 0.000) documenting that the 
“removal of ignorance” increases the distance from the maximin. More interestingly, when we compare the 
spectator  and  the  stakeholder  before  receiving  information  about  payoff  we  find  that  the  former  is 
significantly closer to the maximin choices (Mann-Whitney test, z = -5.975, p = 0.000). This documents that 
absence of conflicts of interest in our experimental setting is a more powerful tool than the ignorance of 
personal payoffs to make decision makers closer to the Rawlsian maximin criterion. 
Another indirect effect which may be measured by looking at our treatment is whether players’ position 
and ignorance of payoffs affect through chosen criteria the distribution of income in the game. By using the 
standard Gini index and looking at the ten different cases described above, we find significant differences in 
the Gini index in three cases: 1) in the STAKE treatment, stakeholders before receiving information about 
payoff opt for lower (at one percent significance level) inequality according to the Gini index in respect to 
stakeholders  after  having  been  informed  on  payoffs, 2 )  s t a k e h o l d e r s  i n  t h e  S T A K E  t r e a t m e n t  b e f o r e  
receiving  information  about  payoffs  tend  to  select  less  unequal  solutions  than  stakeholders  in  the 
INFOSTAKE  treatment  (at  five  percent  significance  level)  and  3)  spectators  before  information  about 
payoffs tend to choose less unequal distributions (at 5%) in respect to stakeholders in the STAKE treatment 
after having received information.   
5.2.2. Econometric findings (robustness check). Since our check on balancing properties among treatments 
is successful, tests presented above are generally deemed sufficient to verify the significance of differences 
in players’ choices across states under the three treatments. Econometric estimates however allow to 
check for the significance of such states net of the impact of socio-demographic controls and, in addition to 
it, the correlation between such controls and players’ choices. 
Our strategy is to propose for each test on the significance of the difference in the choice of a given 
criterion between two treatments in Table 5 a corresponding regression where the significance of the 
treatment dummy is tested after controlling for socio-demographic variables. An added value of this check 22 
 
with respect to the tests is that it gives us an idea of the economic significance (magnitude of the impact) 
which we can compare with descriptive findings in Table 4.  
This implies that we run: a) probit regressions for both each criterion and each combination of choices 
on samples of two conditions at time - for a total of 100 regressions; b) OLS regressions for both each 
measure of inequality and each combination of choices on samples of two conditions at time - for a total of 
20 regressions. Results are displayed in Table 6 
Our base probit specification (estimated for each j-th criterion) is  
CHOICEij=α0j +βkCONDITION kij +∑lγlCONTROLS lij +εij                 (1) 
where CHOICEij is equal to 1 if subject i chooses criterion j, 0 otherwise; CONDITION kij is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the control treatment (that is, the alternative treatment with which 
each benchmark treatment is compared); CONTROLS lij are socio-demografic controls and include: a gender 
dummy, age, the number of household members and a dummy for students having no brothers or sisters, 
the average score at university exam, the score at the school leaving exam, two dummies taking value one 
if the mother (the father) has at least a high school degree, a dummy for those attending religious services, 
a dummy for worker students, for those who volunteer and two discrete qualitative variables measuring 
the town size and income.
17 
Our base OLS specification is  
INEQUALITY MEASUREij=α0j +βkCONDITION kij +∑lγlCONTROLS lij +εij                 (2) 
where INEQUALITY MEASUREij is either the distance from the Rawlsian maximin or the Gini index and 
CONDITION kij and CONTROLS lij are defined as in (1).  
Based on these specifications, the coefficient of the first cell in Table 6 can be read as the result of the 
regression run on the sample made by observations in the STAKE EX ANTE and STAKE EX POST scenarios. 
The dependent variable is the choice of the luck criterion and the control treatment is STAKE EX ANTE. The 
first number in the mentioned cell is the reduction of the probability of choosing the luck criterion when 
                                                           
17 We also use alternatively the number of previous experiments to which the subject participated and the Holt&Laury 
criterion to classify risk averse, risk lover and risk neutral players. Both variables are not significant. Results are 
omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. 23 
 
the  stakeholder  chooses  in  ignorance  of  payoff  distribution  rather  than  with  information.  The  second 
number is the p-value.  
In what follows we briefly summarize regression findings: 
i)  STAKE EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX POST: luck, protection plus effort and protection plus talent confirm 
their  significance.  In  terms  of  magnitude  the  impact  of  receiving  information  on  personal  payoff  is 
substantially similar to what found in the descriptive Table 4 in the base plus talent case (20 percent), while 
it remains significant but substantially lower in the other two cases. Furthermore, receiving information on 
payoff distribution under different criteria reduces the distance from the maximin and leads players to 
reduce by 47 percent criteria including protection, 27 percent those including talent and 24 percent those 
including desert.  
ii)  STAKE EX ANTE vs. INFOSTAKE: as a confirm to previous findings, before receiving information on 
payoffs, stakeholders choose significantly more protection plus talent (around 21 percent), protection plus 
effort (around 13 percent) and significantly less chance (38 percent) than ex ante informed stakeholders. 
This translates into a stronger preference for criteria including protection (55 percent), at least talent (31 
percent)  and  desert  (43  percent).  A  lower  distance  from  the  maximin  for  uninformed  stakeholders  is 
confirmed.  
iii)  STAKE  EX  POST  vs.  INFOSTAKE: w e  f i n d  c o n f i r m a t i o n  t h a t  e x  a n t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  r eceiving 
information generate the same effects on stakeholders;  
iv)  SPECTATOR  EX  ANTE  vs.  STAKE  EX  ANTE:  our  regression  confirms  that  the  relevant  difference 
between stakeholders and spectators before receiving information about payoffs is only in the distance 
from the maximin -  significantly lower for spectators;  
v)  SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. STAKE EX POST: we find confirmation that, before receiving information 
about  payoffs,  spectators  choose  significantly  more p r o t e c t i o n  p l u s  t a l e n t  ( a r o u n d  4 3  p e r c e n t )  a n d  
significantly less luck (16 percent) or pure effort (1 9 p ercen t) th an  stak eh old ers after h avin g  recei ved 24 
 
information. This translates into a stronger preference for criteria including protection (55 percent), at least 
talent (38 percent) and desert (21 percent);  
vi)  SPECTATOR  EX  ANTE  vs.  INFOSTAKE:  when  looking  at  the  comparison  between  stakeholders 
without  information on  payoffs  and  ex  ante  informed  stakeholders  we  find  that  significant  effects on 
protection  plus  talent  and  chance  are  confirmed  with  magnitudes  which  are  quite  close  to  those  in 
descriptive tables. The former choose 55 percent more protection, 48 percent more talent and 45 percent 
more desert than the latter and their distance from the maximin is significantly lower;  
vii)  SPECTATOR EX ANTE vs. SPECTATOR EX POST: it is confirmed that uninformed spectators choose 
significantly more protection plus talent;  
viii)  SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX ANTE: it is confirmed that spectators after having been informed 
choose significantly less talent (12 percent) and significantly more chance (7 percent) than stakeholders 
without information;  
ix)  SPECTATOR EX POST vs. STAKE EX POST: it is confirmed that differences between spectators and 
stakeholders  who  receive  information  about  payoffs  are  strong.  The  former choose  significantly more 
protection plus talent (24 percent) and protection plus effort (2 percent) but significantly less pure talent 
(17 percent) and pure effort (15 percent). Moreover, as a result of these combined differences significantly 
more protection (49 percent) than the latter. Finally, informed spectators are closer to the maximin;  
x)  SPECTATOR EX POST vs. INFOSTAKE: spectators who receive information on payoff distribution 
choose significantly less chance (33 percent) and significantly more base plus talent (23 percent) than ex 
ante informed stakeholders. This translates into a significantly stronger preference for criteria including 
protection (48 percent more) and desert (23 percent). Significant differences on effort and protection plus 
effort previously found in Table 5 are not robust to the introduction of socio-demographic controls. On the 
other hand, a significantly lower distance to the maximin for informed spectators emerges. 
As a final check, we run the same probit and OLS regressions for both each criterion and each measure 
of inequality on the complete sample. In this way we may have a general idea of the overall impact of the 25 
 
ignorance  and  of  (net  of)  that  of  the  given  player’s  position  (stakeholder  or  spectator),  beyond  what 
happens in each two-by-two treatment combinations as described in Table 6. Results are displayed in 
Tables 7a and 7b.  
Our base probit specification is now: 
CHOICEij=α0j + α1STAKEHOLDERij + α2EXPOSTij + α3INFOSTAKEij +∑lγlCONTROLS lij +εij            (3) 
Our base OLS specification is now: 
INEQUALITY MEASUREij= α0j + α1STAKEHOLDERij + α2EXPOSTij + α3INFOSTAKEij +∑lγlCONTROLS lij +εij  (4) 
where STAKEHOLDERkij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the allocator is a stakeholder (her payoffs are 
affected by her decision); EXPOSTkij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is made after having 
received information on payoff distribution; INFOSTAKEkij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is 
made by an ex ante informed stakeholder and all other variables are defined as in (2). 
By  model  construction  significant  results  express  deviations  from  the  choice  of  the  presumedly  most 
disinterested  player  (the  uninformed  spectator).  They  show  that  receiving  information  (EXPOST) 
significantly adds an 18 and an 8 percent to the sample share of participants who chose luck and pure effort 
criteria, respectively, and significantly subtracts a 22 percent to those who chose protection plus talent 
(Table  7a).  Moreover,  and  always  with  respect  to  the  benchmark  of  the  uninformed  spectator, 
stakeholdership adds a 9 percent to the pure effort and a 13 percent to the pure talent choices, while it 
subtracts a 29 percent to the protection plus talent choices These findings imply that the combined effect 
of stakeholdership and of the “removal of ignorance of payoffs” subtracts a 50 percent of experiment 
participants to the sample share of those who chose protection plus talent. Finally, the condition of ex ante 
informed stakeholders, independently from the other two effects, subtracts a 6 percent to the protection 
plus effort choice. This supports the hypothesis that preference for rewarding effort is higher after than 
before players exert effort. 
With regard to the combined criteria the “removal of ignorance” of payoffs subtracts shares of 30, 24 
and 22 percent to criteria involving protection, talent and desert respectively. Finally, the stakeholder 26 
 
status subtracts a 27 percent to the protection criterion. This implies that the combined effect of removal 
of STAKE and stakeholdership, subtracts a 57 percent to the sample share of participants who choose 
protection. 
Overall, our first descriptive findings document some results in line with the previous literature (small 
preference for egalitarianism with concern however for minimal share to least advantaged and self-serving 
bias as documented by Konow 2000). The most relevant result is probably that ignorance of personal payoff 
and the position of spectators are strongly associated with the desire to reward talent but also to ensure a 
minimal base equal for every player.
18 
 
5.3. Results related to QUESTION 2. 
Result 2. The vast majority of(but not all) informed stakeholders choose the criterion that maximizes their 
payoff. 
In this section we investigate if the decision taken by stakeholders in the two treatments where they 
have full information about their payoffs under different criteria, that is the INFOSTAKE and the STAKE EX 
POST treatments, is aimed at maximizing their own payoff or if other motivational drivers matter. 
As already discussed in the previous section, the preferred criterion by stakeholders in the INFOSTAKE 
treatment and in the STAKE treatment after having received information about payoffs is the luck one. By 
contrast, the criteria including protection (protection plus luck, protection plus effort, and protection plus 
talent) are chosen much less than the other criteria. 
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics for payment distributions related to the different criteria (named 
pay_1 - LUCK, pay_2 - EQUAL etc.) under the two treatments. Column 3 shows the standard deviation, 
columns 4 and 5 the minimum and maximum value respectively, and column 6 shows how many subjects 
would have maximized their payoff by choosing the criterion connected to each distribution of payments. It 
tells us that the distribution of payments associated with the luck criterion maximizes the payoff for the 
                                                           
18 This result obviously depend crucially on the choices of selected criteria and on the share of income which has to be 
equally divided among players in mixed criteria which involve some form or protection. It would be interesting to see 
whether decisions change when the share of protection is different and how this affect extreme (egalitarian, pure 
talent and pure effort) choices. 27 
 
greatest  number  of  subjects  both  in  respect  to  the  STAKE  EX  POST  scenario  and  to  the  INFOSTAKE 
treatment. This is a consequence of the fact that the payoff distribution under the luck choice has more 
variability than those under the other criteria (see Figures 2a and 2b showing the cumulative probability 
related  to  the  distributions  of  payments  of  different  criteria  in  the  STAKE  EX  POST  and  INFOSTAKE 
treatment). 
By comparing players’ decisions and their payoff in the two conditions, we find out that: 73 out of 87 
subjects in the STAKE EX POST scenario and 50 out of 59 subjects in the INFOSTAKE treatment chose the 
payoff maximizing criterion. Both in the STAKE EX POST and in the INFOSTAKE , the criterion that was more 
frequently selected by subjects when they did not opt to maximize their payoff is the egalitarian one (Table 
9).  
In respect to the STAKE treatment, where subjects had the opportunity to revise their decision, one may 
wonder if the decision to maximize or not the monetary payoff is due to the value of the difference 
between the payoff associated with the criterion chosen ex ante and the maximum payoff ex post (if the 
increase in the payoff obtained by changing the criterion was low, a player could decide not to change her 
decision). This seems not to be the case: players who did not maximize their payoff “gave up” 1.9 euro on 
average, while there were 20 subjects (22.99% of the total sample of subjects in the STAKE EX POST) that 
decided to change the criterion even though it generated a payoff increase lower than 1.9 euro.  
With regard to our second research question, we may c on clu d e th at th e g r eat maj orit y of p layer s 
(84.2%)
19 b e h a v e d ,  u n d e r  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  p a y o f f  d i stribution,  as  the  standard  “homo 
oeconomicus” approach would have predicted, by choosing the criterion only in order to maximize their 
monetary gain.  
This behaviour is consistent with results from several studies documenting self-serving bias in fairness 
judgment (Forsythe et al. 1994; Hoffman et al. 1994; Babcock et al. 1996; Kagel et al. 1996; Konow 2000; 
Messick and  Sentis 1979) even when payments are hypothetical. 
                                                           
19 Among them and, in particular, in respect to the STAKE treatment, it must be considered that 13.8% of players who 
first choose in ignorance of their payoffs under different criteria did not need to modify their choices since their ex 
ante criterion proved to be the one with highest gain for them after the information about payoffs is given. 28 
 
5.4. Results related to QUESTION 3. 
Result 3. Around 2/3 of subjects tend to choose the criterion where they believe they will obtain the 
highest payoff 
In this section we investigate two main strictly interrelated issues: 
1)  do subjects without information about their payoffs under different criteria choose the criterion 
that they suppose will maximize their payoff or do they choose according to some fairness ideals 
(that  the  majority  of  players  are  ready  to  leave  as s o o n  a s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
monetary payoff is evident)? 
2)  is the decision to opt for meritocratic criteria (and in particular the protection plus talent criterion 
which  is  the  most  frequently  selected  criterion)  due  to  the  players’  belief  of  having  the  best 
performance in those criteria? 
In order to analyze in depth these two issues, in three out of six sessions of the STAKE treatment we 
asked subjects their belief in their relative performances in the different criteria (except, obviously, the 
strict  egalitarian  one).  In  particular,  we  asked  players  to  declare  how many  subjects  they  believe will 
perform better than themselves in each criterion. 
With regard to the first issue, Table 10 shows the number of subjects who chose the different criteria 
(column 3) and, in respect to each criterion, the number of subjects who chose that specific criterion 
because of the belief that it was the one where they would have had the best relative performance (column 
4). Such Table shows that 23 out of 34
20 players in ignorance of their payoff chose the criterion where they 
believed to have the best relative performance and then, presumably, to obtain the highest payoff. 18 out 
of these 23 subjects did not earn the highest payoff in the selected criterion and all of them opted for 
changing the criterion after having received the information about their payoff in order to maximize their 
monetary gain except one.  
                                                           
20 Players who chose the egalitarian criterion are obviously excluded from this count since under such criterion all 
players obtain the same payoff by definition. 29 
 
Moreover, if we consider the 11 subjects who did not choose, without information, the criterion where 
they believed to have the best relative performance, we notice that 8 decided to change the criterion in 
order to maximize their monetary gain after having been informed about the distribution of their payoffs 
across the different criteria.  
This analysis seems to show two main results: subjects tend to choose the criterion in which they 
believe to obtain the highest payoff; subjects who seem to choose a criterion according to a fairness ideal, 
do not hesitate to change the criterion when they realize that their payoff would be higher by choosing a 
specific different criterion. 
In respect to the second issue, Table 10 reveals that, for the great majority of players (67.74%) who 
chose the meritocratic criteria (effort, talent, protection plus effort and protection plus talent), the choice 
was  associated  with  their  belief  to  have  the  best  relative  performance  in  the  selected  criterion.  The 
percentage dramatically increases when we focus on the two criteria based on talent (82.61%) and is lower 
when  we  consider  criteria  based  on  effort  (25%).  Moreover,  20  out  of  26  subjects  who  opted  for 
meritocratic criteria and did not maximize their payoff by doing so, decided to change their decision after 
having received the information about their payoff in order to obtain the maximum gain (this tendency is 
confirmed also for subjects who selected the effort criterion without believing that it was the best choice in 
terms of payoff: 5 out of 8 changed the criterion in order to maximize their payoff ex post). By contrast, 
only 3 subjects decided not to change the criterion even though it was not the maximizing one and 3 
players changed the criterion without selecting the maximizing one. Even though we do not have enough 
data to perform econometric analysis related to the decision to change or not the criterion in relation to 
belief, the above mentioned evidence seems to suggest that the decision to opt for meritocratic criteria is 
essentially associated with a self-interested goal and not with the willingness to follow a non self-interested 
ideal based on fairness or other principles. This finding reinforces the idea that the spectator condition is 




In  a  very  well  known  sentence  Adam  Smith  associates j u s t i c e  t o  t h e  s e n t i m e n t s  o f  t h e  i m p a r t i a l  
spectator, a situation in which we rarely happen to be in life.
21 We do not aim to reproduce that situation in 
this paper but we wonder what is the preferred criterion of a human spectator (a human allocator whose 
monetary payoffs are not affected by her choice) for allocating resources under different scenarios and 
how does it differ from that of the involved stakeholder.  
We investigate this issue with a randomized experiment with choice of allocation criteria and task 
performance.  
Our findings may be summarized by the following five considerations: i) with information about payoff 
distribution, third parties (spectators) reward significantly more talent but also allow significantly more for 
a minimal protection than stakeholders (effect of non stakeholdership in presence of information); ii) the 
absence of information about payoffs levels the differences between stakeholders and spectators (effect of 
non  stakeholdership  in  absence  of  information);  iii)  within  and  between  effects  of  the  “removal  of  
ignorance” are substantially the same for stakeholders who choose significantly more meritocratic criteria 
(based on talent) plus a minimum base protection without information  (effect of absence of information 
for stakeholders); iv) choices of stakeholders are substantially the same if they are informed ex ante or they 
become informed ex post  (equivalence between “removal and absence of ignorance”); v) the “removal of 
ignorance” leads spectators to reduce inequality (effect of the “removal of ignorance” for spectators), v) 
preference for rewarding effort increases after effort has been exerted; vi) the “removal of ignorance on 
payoffs”  induces  the  large  majority  of  players  to  change  their  allocation  criteria  for  the  one  which 
maximizes their own payoff even when the extra gain is very small (less than one or two euros) and two 
                                                           
21 No man during, either the whole of his life, or that of any considerable part of it, ever trod steadily and uniformly in 
the path … of justice, … whose conduct was not principally directed y a regard to the sentiments of the supposed 
impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. 
– Adam Smith (1759) p. 357 
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thirds of ex ante stakeholders’ choices without information coincides with criteria in which they believe to 
have the best relative performance  
Our  results  provides  insights  for  normative  processes  in  which  rules  concerning  the  distribution  of 
resources (and characteristics of subjects who are in the better position to take decisions over such rules) 
within the community have to be designed. This study could, for example, contribute to identify: i) criteria 
aimed at defining career access in relation to public organizations (e.g. universities, local public authorities 
etc.)  or  access  to  public  grants  coherent  with  people’s  preferences  on  distributive  justice;  ii)  desired 
attributes of those who should be in charge of defining such criteria. 
Our findings clearly suggest that, if we are interested in promoting meritocracy, the best way to achieve 
this  goal  is  to  assign  choice  about  allocation  criteria  to  spectators  and  not  to  stakeholders  since 
stakeholders (even when they ignore their relative position under different conditionss) are clearly oriented 
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Figure 1b Experimental observations 
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YES  YES  NO 
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Table 1 Variable legend 
Year   Year of birth  
Male   Dummy variable (DV) taking value one if the respondent is a male 
LoneChild  DV taking value one if the respondent has no brothers or sisters 
HouseMembers  Total number of respondent’s household members 
 Townsize 
Discrete qualitative variable for town size: 1:0-10.000 inhabitants; 2:10.001-
25.000 inhabitants; 3:25.001-50.000 inhabitants; 4:50.001-100.000 inhabitants; 
5:100.001-300.000 inhabitants; beyond 300.000 inhabitants; 
Reader  
Variable  measuring how many times in a week the respondent reads 
newspapers (it takes integer values from 1 to 5). 
Risk    
Variable measuring the general willingness of the respondent in taking risk (it 
takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
 Catholic   DV taking value one if the respondent is Catholic 
 ChurchAttendance 
Variable measuring how many times in a year the respondent usually attends a 
religious service 
 Volunteer    
DV taking value one if the respondent is engaged in social activities as 
volonteer  
 MarriedParents  DV taking value one if the respondent parents are married 
MotherEducation 
DV taking value one if the respondent mother has at least high school 
education 
FatherEducation  DV taking value one if the respondent father has at least high school education 
Income     Income level of the respondent’s household  
 MathGrade  The average score of the respondent’s school leaving examination 
 AvgExamScore  Average score of university exams 
Erasmus     DV taking value one if the respondent has an ERASMUS experience 
LivAbroad 
DV taking value one if the subject declared that he has lived abroad for at least 
more than 1 month in the past 
 StudentWorker  DV taking value one if the student is also a worker 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
  Year     265      1987.287   2.604    1970    1991 
 Male   265      0.604    0.490       0       1 
 LoneChild  265      0.132   0.339       0       1 
 HouseMembers    265      3.894   1.344       1      11 
 TownSize  265  3.298   1.842       1       6 
  Reader    265      1.000   0.000       1       1 
  Risk     262      5.935   1.938       1      10 
 Catholic    261      0.636     0.482       0       1 
 ChurchAttendance   264      2.189   1.246       1       5 
 Volunteer    264      0.273  0.455       0       2 
 MarriedParents    261      0.870   0.337       0       1 
MotherHighEducation  265  0.619  0.486     0       1 
FatherHighEducation  265  0.634  0.483     0       1 
 Income     253          2.549   1.059       1       5 
 MathGrade    252      78.349   12.142      43     100 
 AvgExamScore    258      25.050   3.281    20      30 
Erasmus     263     0.046   0.209       0       1 
 LivAbroad    257      0.210   0.408       0       1 














































H0: (2) = (3) 
(P-value) 
 
  Year    
1987.023  1987.288  1987.479  (0.814)  (0.786)  (0.475)  (0.999)  (0.356)  (0.408) 
 Male  
0 .598  0.627  0.597  -  (0.721)  -  (0.817)  -  (0.906) 
 LoneChild  0.103  0.203  0.117  -  (0.091)  -  (0.800)  -  (0.197) 
 HouseMembers    3.988  4.000  3.773  (0.191)  (0.693)  (0.590)  (0.988)  (0.060)  (0.138) 
 TownSize  3.218  3.373  3.319  (0.632)  (0.502)  (0.843)  (0.894)  (0.798)  (0.428) 
  Reader    2.873  2.729  2.613  (0.711)  (0.763)  (0.253)  (0.628)  (0.540)  (0.999) 
  Risk     6.081  5.763  5.914  (0.317)  (0.730)  (0.601)  (0.935)  (0.527)  (0.780) 
 Catholic   
0.706  0.627  0.590  -  (0.322)  -  (0.721)  -  (0.562) 
 ChurchAttendance   2.372  2.000  2.151  (0.183)  (0.603)  (0.430)  (0.901)  (0.434)  (0.999) 
 Volunteer    0.322  0.305  0.220  -  (0.710)  -  (0.704)  -  (0.952) 
 MarriedParents    0.873  0.875  0.864  -  (0.980)  -  (0.467)  -  (0.502) 
MotherHighEducation  0.609  0.576  0.647  -  (0.691)  -  (0.258)  -  (0.160) 
FatherHighEducation  0.644  0.593  0.647  -  (0.537)  -  (0.899)  -  (0.653) 
 Income     2.553  2.526  2.558  (0.945)  (0.959)  (0.881)  (0.994)  (0.972)  (0.999) 
 MathGrade    77.222  77.714  79.452  (0.849)  (0.937)  (0.146)  (0.182)  (0.273)  (0.292) 
 AvgExamScore    25.468  24.793  24.875  (0.384)  (0.909)  (0.454)  (0.509)  (0.800)  (0.988) 
Erasmus     0.057  0.034  0.042  (0.528)  (0.527)  -  (0.513)  -  (0.986) 
 LivAbroad    0.247  0.186  0.195  (0.391)  (0.390)  -  (0.062)  -  (0.324) 
 StudWorker   0 .322  0.305  0.328  (0.831)  (0.831)  -  (0.573)  -  (0.477) 
* For continuous variables we test - through nonparametric statistics - between-subject differences by using the 
Mann-Whitney  test.  We  also  test  differences  in  the  distribution  through  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test,  while f o r  




Table 4 Descriptive evidence on players’ choices 
 S T A K E   E X   A N T E  
N                  % 
 (1) 
STAKE EX POST 
N                  % 
(2) 
INFOSTAKE 
N                  % 
(3) 
SPECTATOR EX ANTE 
N                  % 
(4) 
SPECTATOR EX POST 
N                  % 
(5) 
No information 
N                  % 
(1) + (4) 
Full information 
N                  % 
(2) + (3) + (5) 
Luck  5  5.75  28  32.18  25  42.37  9  15.00  11  18.33  14  9.52  64  31.07 
Equal  14  16.09  13  14.94  7  11.86  6  10.00  10  16.67  20  13.61 3 0  1 4 . 5 6  
Effort  7  8.05  17  19.54  10  16.95  2  3.33  3  5.00  9  6.12  30  14.56 
Talent  21  24.14  21  24.14  13  22.03  9  15.00  6  10.00  30  20.41 4 0  1 9 . 4 2  
Protection + 
luck 
0  0  1  1.15  1  1.69  2  3.33  2  3.33  2  1.36  4  1.94 
Protection + 
effort  14  16.09  4  4.6  1  1.69  5  8.33  8  13.33  19  12.93  13  6.31 
Protection + 
talent 
26  29.89  3  3.45  2  3.39  27  45.00  20  33.33  53  36.05  25  12.14 
Total  87  100  87  100  59  100  60  100  60  100  147  100  206  100 
  COMBINATION OF CHOICES 
Protection  54  62.07  20  22.99  10  16.95  38  63.33  38  63.33  92  65.58  68  33.01 
At least talent  47  54.02  24  27.59  15  25.42  36  60  26  43.33  83  56.46  65  31.55 
At least effort  21  24.14  21  24.14  11  18.64  7  11.67  11  18.33  28  19.05  43  20.87 
Desert  68  78.16  45  51.72  26  44.07  43  71.7  37  61.7  111  75.51  108  52.43 
Combination of choices: Protection (Equal or protection plus talent or protection plus effort); At least talent (talent or protection plus talent); at least effort (effort or 
protection plus effort); Desert (talent or effort, or protection plus effort or protection plus talent). 38 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   a Chi square test for between-subject comparisons;  Stuart-Maxwell test for within-subject comparisons 
b Chi square test for between-subject comparisons; Mc Nemar test for within-subject comparisons 
c Mann-Whitney test for between-subject comparisons; Wilcoxon test for within-subject comparisons 39 
 
 















































































































































































Combination of choices 































































































































Coefficient and standard error (in round brackets) of the CONDITION variable in a regression in which the criterion in row is regressed on a set of socio-demographic controls 
(see equations (1) and (2) in section 5.2.2). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  40 
 
Table 7a. The effect of “ignorance of payoffs” and stakeholdership on players’ choices  




plus talent  Equal 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Expost  0.179***  0.082**  0.010  -0.046  -0.223***  0.016 
 
(0.045)  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.030)  (0.049)  (0.034) 
Info  0.151*  -0.041  -0.014  -0.065***  -0.067  -0.019 
 
(0.083)  (0.039)  (0.072)  (0.020)  (0.066)  (0.041) 
stakeholder  0.028  0.095***  0.133**  -0.007  -0.286*** 0 . 0 4 3  
 
(0.062)  (0.034)  (0.055)  (0.030)  (0.085)  (0.033) 
Year  -0.014  0.009  -0.002  0.000  0.003  0.002 
 
(0.010)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
Male  0.086  0.039  0.072  -0.010  -0.175***  -0.036 
 
(0.053)  (0.034)  (0.058)  (0.030)  (0.064)  (0.043) 
LoneChild  0.042  0.080  -0.089  0.142*  0.008  -0.087*** 
 
(0.077)  (0.081)  (0.059)  (0.075)  (0.081)  (0.025) 
HouseMembers  0.008  -0.056***  0.013  -0.004  0.033  0.012 
 
(0.024)  (0.020)  (0.029)  (0.011)  (0.028)  (0.019) 
TownSize  -0.028*  0.001  0.038**  -0.004  0.018  -0.002 
 
(0.014)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.009) 
Reader  -0.024  0.007  -0.012  0.002  0.033*  -0.020 
 
(0.019)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.013) 
Risk  0.010  -0.000  -0.000  -0.022***  0.028**  0.001 
 
(0.012)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Catholic  -0.017  0.021  0.066  0.055**  -0.083  -0.066 
 
(0.065)  (0.048)  (0.069)  (0.025)  (0.080)  (0.057) 
ChurchAttendance  -0.019  -0.014  -0.027  -0.019  0.035  0.046*** 
 
(0.024)  (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.016) 
Volunteer  0.032  0.012  -0.083  0.008  0.004  -0.019 
 
(0.051)  (0.034)  (0.059)  (0.034)  (0.051)  (0.031) 




(0.090)  (0.036)  (0.106)  (0.083) 
MotherHighEducation  -0.076  0.065  0.155**  -0.015  -0.075  -0.099* 
 
(0.060)  (0.047)  (0.060)  (0.040)  (0.070)  (0.051) 
FatherHighEducation  -0.011  -0.107*  0.014  0.012  0.096*  -0.019 
 
(0.056)  (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.028)  (0.053)  (0.033) 
Income  -0.015  0.026  0.027  -0.037**  -0.052*  0.052*** 
 
(0.026)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.017) 
MathGrade  -0.002  -0.001  0.006**  0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
AvgExamScore  -0.006  -0.002  0.025*  -0.006  -0.009  -0.002 
 
(0.009)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
Erasmus  0.002  0.014  0.097    0.189  -0.037 
 
(0.127)  (0.091)  (0.147) 
 
(0.213)  (0.046) 
LivAbroad  -0.023  -0.002  0.001  -0.016  -0.128***  0.168* 
 
(0.069)  (0.046)  (0.082)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.088) 
StudentWorker  -0.044  0.019  0.025  0.025  -0.038  0.012 
 















Observations  267  244  267  254  267  267 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. standard errors clustered at individual and session level. 41 
 
Table 7b The effect of “ignorance of payoffs” and stakeholdership on combined players’ choices 
 
Protection  At least effort  At least talent  Desert  Distance from Rawls  Gini 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Expost  -0.303***  0.030  -0.242***  -0.223***  1.264**  0.040*** 
 
(0.064)  (0.046)  (0.060)  (0.057)  (0.501)  (0.013) 
Info  -0.174*  -0.133**  -0.046  -0.174*  1.217  -0.007 
 
(0.094)  (0.054)  (0.099)  (0.097)  (0.803)  (0.020) 
Stakeholder  -0.274***  0.083  -0.177*  -0.090  0.491  0.033** 
 
(0.082)  (0.054)  (0.094)  (0.085)  (0.587)  (0.014) 
Year  0.003  0.007  0.007  0.015  -0.084  -0.002 
 
(0.017)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.113)  (0.003) 
Male  -0.262***  0.018  -0.080  -0.045  1.441***  0.035** 
 
(0.075)  (0.052)  (0.086)  (0.078)  (0.547)  (0.013) 
LoneChild  -0.005  0.190*  -0.107  0.105  0.840  0.020 
 
(0.098)  (0.106)  (0.101)  (0.086)  (0.679)  (0.018) 
HouseMembers  0.043  -0.051*  0.044  -0.009  -0.189  -0.020 
 
(0.039)  (0.026)  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.265)  (0.007) 
TownSize  -0.004  -0.006  0.050**  0.043**  -0.154  -0.004 
 
(0.022)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.152)  (0.004) 
Reader  0.019  0.005  0.039  0.041  -0.112  -0.006 
 
(0.028)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.187)  (0.005) 
Risk  -0.008  -0.029**  0.024  -0.006  0.152  0.003 
 
(0.018)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.120)  (0.003) 
Catholic  -0.090  0.085  0.018  0.108  0.305  0.001 
 
(0.101)  (0.061)  (0.103)  (0.099)  (0.677)  (0.017) 
ChurchAttendance  0.085**  -0.037  -0.008  -0.042  -0.500**  -0.015** 
 
(0.036)  (0.026)  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.244)  (0.006) 
Volunteer  0.010  0.038  -0.064  -0.029  0.332  0.007 
 
(0.075)  (0.056)  (0.076)  (0.072)  (0.467)  (0.012) 
MarriedParents  -0.043  0.134**  -0.054  0.120  -0.667  0.007 
 
(0.120)  (0.066)  (0.152)  (0.150)  (0.993)  (0.021) 
MotherHighEducation  -0.201**  0.065  0.088  0.151*  0.214  -0.007 
 
(0.093)  (0.068)  (0.094)  (0.085)  (0.641)  (0.018) 
FatherHighEducation  0.099  -0.088  0.129  0.028  -0.077  0.005 
 
(0.076)  (0.064)  (0.083)  (0.075)  (0.545)  (0.013) 
Income  -0.034  -0.022  -0.019  -0.046  -0.179  -0.006 
 
(0.040)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.271)  (0.007) 
MathGrade  -0.005  0.000  0.005  0.004  0.016  -0.001 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.022)  (0.000) 
AvgExamScore  -0.015  -0.010  0.026  0.010  -0.001  -0.002 
 
(0.015)  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.122)  (0.003) 
Erasmus  -0.096  -0.097  0.185  0.084  1.166  0.037 
 
(0.164)  (0.091)  (0.184)  (0.129)  (1.418)  (0.044) 
LivAbroad  0.027  -0.040  -0.152  -0.197*  -1.011  -0.026 
 
(0.111)  (0.061)  (0.118)  (0.119)  (0.886)  (0.021) 
StudentWorker  -0.026  0.019  -0.002  0.005  -0.145  -0.009 
 













       
0.144  0.151 
Observations  267  267  267  267  267  267 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. standard errors clustered at individual and session level. 42 
 


















STAKE ex post 
(N = 87) 
pay_1 – LUCK  8.54  .4  37.1  34 
pay_2 – EQUAL  0  14  14  13 
pay_3 – EFFORT  3.69  4.8  24.8  20 
pay_4 – TALENT  4.07  5.3  21.6  21 
pay_5 – 
PROTECTION+LUCK 
5.97  4.5  30.2  0 
pay_6 – 
PROTECTION+EFFORT  2.58  7.6  21.6  2 
pay_7 – 
PROTECTION+TALENT 




(N = 59) 
 
pay_1 – LUCK  7.93  .7  33.5  27 
pay_2 – EQUAL  0  14  14  6 
pay_3 – EFFORT  3.34  6.1  22.2  10 
pay_4 – TALENT  3.61  6.4  20.4  16 
pay_5 – 
PROTECTION+LUCK 
5.54  4.7  27.6  0 
pay_6 – 
PROTECTION+EFFORT 
2.34  8.5  19.8  1 
pay_7 – 
PROTECTION+TALENT 
2.54  8.7  18.5  0 
 
Fig. 2a Cumulative probability                    Fig.2b Cumulative probability related to the 
      related to the distribution of payments               distribution of payments of different 
       of different criteria in the STAKE                  criteria in the INFOSTAKE treatment 
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22 In case for a subject two or more criteria gave the same maximum payoff, we took into consideration and included 









Number of times the criterion 
was selected without 
maximizing the payoff 
 
 
STAKE  ex 
post 
(number  of 
obs. 87) 
LUCK  1 
EQUAL  6 
EFFORT  3 
TALENT  4 
PROTECTION+LUCK  1 
PROTECTION+EFFORT  3 




(number  of 
obs. 59) 
 
LUCK  1 
EQUAL  4 
EFFORT  2 
TALENT  2 
PROTECTION+LUCK  1 
PROTECTION+EFFORT  1 
PROTECTION+TALENT  2 
 




Number of times the 
criterion was selected 
Number of players who 




STK ex post 
(N =  42) 
LUCK  3  2 
EQUAL  8   
EFFORT  1  0 
TALENT  9  8 
PROTECTION+LUCK  0  0 
PROTECTION+EFFORT  7  2 
PROTECTION+TALENT  14  11 
 
 
 
 